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This paper examines the relationship between timing of negotiations and idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) through the moderating effects of core self-evaluations (CSE), and between i-deals and employee reactions through the moderating effects of transformational leadership behaviour (TLB) in the Indian hospitality industry.

A total of 275 employees working in 39 companies responded to a self-administered questionnaire. To test the research hypotheses, the methodology of structural equation models was used.

The results show that the relationship between before hiring negotiations and i-deals is stronger for those individuals who had low self-worth, due to countervailing forces created by their belief that they may not be eligible for i-deals. In contrast, the relationship between after hiring negotiations and i-deals is stronger for those who had high self-worth, due to their belief that they were entitled to i-deals. Additionally, the research highlights that the relationship between i-deals and employee reactions is stronger for those organisations, which are high on TLB.

The data does not allow for investigating dynamic causal inferences, because they were collected using a questionnaire at a single point in time, and they were reported in retrospect, raising measurement concerns about recall bias.

From a managerial point of view, the findings of this study inform that in negotiating both employment conditions and work arrangements, organisations should try to achieve i-deals that are primarily flexibility focused, and that in increasing efficiency organisations should make the employees feel well supported in order to develop more confidence in deploying skills and abilities to address a more open view of their i-deals.

The study contributes to our understanding about the Indian hospitality industry by utilising the self-enhancement theory in examining whether individual differences moderate the relationship between the timing of negotiations and i-deals, and also by utilizing the social exchange theory to examine whether TLB moderates the relationship between i-deals and employee reactions.

The study has a two‐fold purpose: to investigate whether some specific characteristics of hotels affect organisational performance in the hotel industry in India; and to investigate whether some HRM systems affect organisational performance in the hotel industry in India.

A total of 439 hotels, ranging from three‐star to five‐star deluxe, responded to a self‐administered questionnaire that measured 27 HRM practices, five organisational performance variables, and ten demographic variables. Factor analysis was performed to identify HRM systems, one‐way ANOVA was employed to test the association of the demographic variables with organisational performance, and correlation analysis was used to test the relation between HRM systems and organisational performance.

The results indicate that hotel performance is positively associated with hotel category and type of hotel (chain or individual). Furthermore, hotel performance is positively related to the HRM systems of recruitment and selection, manpower planning, job design, training and development, quality circle, and pay systems.

Single respondent bias may have occurred because a single respondent from each organisation provided information on HRM practices and perceived measures of organisational performance. The sample was drawn from the population of best performing hotels in India, so is not representative of the hotel industry in India.

If hotels are to achieve higher performance levels, they should preferably belong to a chain and increase their category, and management should focus on “best” HRM practices indicated in the study.

The study makes a modest attempt to add information to the very little empirical knowledge available referring to the link between HRM and performance in the hotel industry.

During a press conference at the Imperial Hotel in Delhi on 13 March 2001, the Internet news site, Tehelka.com, showed secret video footage of senior politicians, bureaucrats, and army officers accepting money in a fake defense deal. Two journalists from Tehelka, Anirudha Bahal and Mathew Samuel, posed as arms dealers from a fictitious arms company called West End International to sell nonexistent handheld thermal cameras to senior officials of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in India. Bahal and Samuel paid bribes to politicians, civil servants, and army officers to procure government contracts. The journalists used three hidden cameras to videotape the corrupt politicians and officials accepting the bribes, with the most dramatic video clip showing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) President, Bangaru Laxman, accepting a wad of currency notes from them. Laxman later claimed that he was not guilty of wrongdoing for accepting Rs. 100,000 (US$2,170) as a donation for the BJP. Describing the episode as “concocted,” he added that he had given the donation to the BJP's treasurer (BBC News, 2001a).